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I. AN OVERVIEW
Historically, the existence of legal malpractice was appar-
ently a judicial embarrassment if the scant appellate authority is
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any guide.' In the forties and fifties appellate courts forged com-
prehensive rules governing the missteps of the medical profession.
Until the seventies, however, courts generally took a protective
and paternalistic approach to the legal profession.2 Since the
early seventies, though, there has been a ground swell toward
narrowing the gap. The ground swell has been viewed with alarm
by lawyers-as well it might. Whereas the doctor, at least in his
own mind, is encumbered by onerous and unfair legal restrictions,
he nevertheless enjoys in the community a godlike stature that
severely blunts the edge of the judicial sword. The lawyer, on the
other hand, enjoying community stature somewhere between that
of an automobile salesman and an undertaker,' has needed all the
protection the law could muster about him. As legal privileges
and immunities have eroded, the lawyer has viewed with horror
the submission of his fate to a jury of twelve laymen.
We have arrived at the end of the era of privilege. Legal
malpractice litigation is with us. The purpose of this article is to
view the panorama of legal negligence from the eyes of the plain-
tiff's lawyer. There will be no in-depth discussion of the history
and development of the law in the field, for that would encompass
a volume in itself.' Rather the purpose is to strip away the mys-
tique that inevitably surrounds any recently expanded body of
law and to apply the already at-hand skills of the contemporary
lawyer to the particularities of legal mialpractice litigation. The
article is designed for the general practitioner as well as the spe-
cialist. Not only is consideration given to techniques helpful to
1. Evidence of the relative scarcity of appellate authority is seen in the treatment of
the subject in legal encyclopedias. For example, in 7 CAL. JUR. 3d Attorneys at Law §§
278-285 (1973), under the sub-heading, "Malpractice," there are 26 cases cited from the
years 1870 to 1969 and 23 cases cited for the nine years since 1969. By comparison, from
1870 to 1969 the California Supreme Court Reports encompasses 291 volumes, while only
20 volumes have been published since 1969.
2. Early case law often held that an attorney must be found to have been "grossly
negligent" or shown "gross ignorance" before he could be found to be professionally negli-
gent. E.g., W.L. Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rollwage, 187 Ark. 1084, 63 S.W.2d 841 (1933). See
also King, Legal Malpractice-The Coming Storm, 50 CAL. B.J. 362, 363 (1973); Wallach
& Kelley, Attorney Malpractice in California-A Shaky Citadel, 9 CAL. TRIAL LAw. A.J.
89, 91 (1971).
3. Although the author must plead guilty to hyperbole with intent to jest, a recent
(1977) survey by pollster Mervyn Field actually reported that public confidence in the
legal profession ranked just below that in Congress and just above that of the insurance
industry. Of ten institutions that were the subject of that survey, the legal profession
ranked eighth.
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STRONG PLAINTIFFS CASE
the lawyer representing the plaintiff, but, hopefully, valuable as-
sistance will also be given to the practitioner who must determine
which cases offered him are nonmeritorious and should be re-
jected. Most experts agree that the secret to a successful profes-
sional liability practice is meticulous screening of cases well in
advance of filing suit.
II. A PHILOSOPHIC EXAMINATION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S
LAWYER'S ROLE IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
Twenty years ago the lawyer who undertook to sue a col-
league for malpractice was granted fill pariah status in the local
legal community. At the same time, our colleagues bemoaned
loudly, and justifiably, the "Conspiracy of Silence" within our
sister profession, medicine. Paradoxically, the most strident
voices condemning the hypocrisy of those bound by the Hippo-
cratic Oath were often the most vociferous in damning the rascal
who represented a plaintiff against one of the club. Dedicated
malpractice counsel overcame the refusal of physicians to testify
against each other by skillfully cross-examining them and by per-
suading courts to expand the res ipsa loquitor doctrine.5 Semi-
nars, law review articles, and trial practice symposia exhorted the
profession to acquire these skills-and acquire them we did.
The plight of the legal malpractice victim, of course, was
ameliorated not one whit by the medical malpractice explosion,
for the strong voice of the trial bar against the miscreant physi-
cian was virtually unavailable to the victim of legal incompet-
ence. During that halcyon era before the seventies, the boast of
the plaintiffs bar that it "comforted the afflicted by afflicting the
comfortable" apparently did not extend to bringing its substan-
tial talent to bear on behalf of those "afflicted" by a lawyer.
Do not forget that the fifties and sixties saw not only the
medical profession brought to task. These were also the nascent
decades of consumerism. The manufacturer's shield was stripped
away with the judicial announcement of the enlightened doctrine
of strict liability in tort.' Archaic immunities of landowners,
which had descended from the ancient English law, were pushed
5. Compare Robinson v. Wirts, 387 Pa. 291, 127 A.2d 706 (1956) (refusing to apply
the doctrine) with Quintal v. Laural Grove Hospital, 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 577 (1964).
6. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
1979]
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to the wayside.' Shabby practices of insurance adjusters were
exposed and prohibited.' Safety orders to protect workers were
spewed forth by legislatures. The polluters of our environment
were brought to their knees. Ralph Nader preached the dogma of
consumers' rights. The consumer was king-except against his
attorney. The lawyer still enjbyed relative immunity-at least
compared to the rest of society-from his misdeeds. By its very
nature, though, our adversary system always results in a winner
and a loser so that every case has malpractice potential. This
once served as a justification for the attorney's privileged posi-
tion.
Whether it was the embarrassment of having one's hypocrisy
exposed, the emergence of a new breed of consumer-oriented law-
yer or merely that our time had come, the worm turned in the late
sixties and early seventies. Suddenly, the lawyer was, despite
himself, in the midst of the age of consumerism.' Legal malprac-
tice insurance rates soared.'"
Although an attorney who regularly represents plaintiffs in
legal malpractice cases may suffer a degree of enmity from some
colleagues, particularly those he names as defendants, he is not
now in jeopardy of losing all friendship, nor of losing his license.
Much of the bar has belatedly accepted that lawyers are not, and
ought not be, above the law. We, like all persons, should be ac-
countable for our neglect. In these times when our image is tar-
nished by the aftermath of Watergate, this accountability is a
healthy sign. To regain the public trust, it is fitting that the
profession say a mea culpa.
It is not suggested here that the profession should be sub-
jected to a higher standard of care. The present laws are generally
adequate, and, heaven knows, juries do not show great mercy to
the lawyer-defendant. This, of course, presents a dilemma for a
plaintiff's counsel. The quantum of neglect that would never re-
sult in a verdict against a doctor, nor, for that matter, a bus
driver, may well convince a jury to bring in a verdict against a
lawyer. Lawyers are not only poor witnesses, but unloved wit-
nesses as well. In evaluating a potential legal malpractice case,
7. E.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97'(1968).
8. E.g., Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
9. See Zelle & Stanhope, Lawyer Malpractice: The Boomerang Principle, 13 TRL
16 (1977).
10. For example, between 1975 and 1977 Traveller's Insurance Company, under a
contract with the State Bar of California to provide malpractice insurance for members,
raised their premiums by nearly 500% and in 1978 raised them again by 35%.
[Vol. 30
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the plaintiffs lawyer is on the horns of a dilemma. He may well
prevail in a shabby case of liability, but knows that there but for
the grace of God goes he. The duty to the client and the lawyer's
self-interest are inexorably drawn into conflict. It is hoped that
the thoughts in this article will help resolve the conflict.
Obviously, the practitioner is free to accept or reject legal
malpractice litigation." The latter approach resolves the conflict,
but, if widespread, it exacerbates the underlying problems. If a
client relates facts that indicate a meritorious case, misadvising
the client that no malpractice exists would be reprehensible and,
of course, malpractice itself. It is a mere truism to say that, here,
honesty is the only policy. The profession has an obligation to its
victims, and an attorney confronted with such a situation has a
public duty'2 either to represent the client or refer him to compe-
tent counsel less squeamish about doing so.
III. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CASE: DOES THE CASE WARRANT
PROCEEDING FURTHER?
As previously indicated, preliminary screening of any poten-
tial legal malpractice suit is the sine qua non of a successful
practice. Not only does it shield the would-be plaintiff's counsel
from unnecessary time, effort, and expense in prosecuting worth-
less cases, but it is also a matter of professional courtesy to the
attorney-defendant against whom there may not be a viable cause
of action.
Clearly every litigant conceives of his cause as the epitome
of justice. Absent avarice, he would not come to the lawyer in the
first place unless motivated by self-righteousness. He is prone to
make light of any equities flowing in his opponent's direction, and
he can rationalize with Houdini-like facility any weakness in his
own case. Therefore, when judgment goes against the forces of
right and for the forces of evil, the litigant is preconditioned to
bitter nonacceptance. Who is in a better position to be the new
whipping boy than the lawyer whose bumbling ineptitude lost the
litigant's air-tight case? The author has personally heard the fol-
lowing indictments.:
ii. Although the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION
No. 2-28 states in part that "the personal preference of a lawyer to avoid adversary
alignment against. . . other lawyers ... does not justify his rejection of tendered em-
ployment," as a practical matter, of course, no lawyer can be forced to take a case.
12. Id. This public duty is embodied in the ethical obligation.
1979]
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"He was drunk all through the trial." (He was a notorious
teetotaler.)
"He didn't take any depositions before trial." (He
did-twice as many as the author would have taken.)
"The kid was just out of law school." (The kid was-ten
years out.)
"The judge was in cahoots with the other attorney and he
didn't do anything about it." (As if he could.)
The thrust of these statements is, of course, that the losing liti-
gant will understandably suffer disappointment. Many people
accept the judgment of their peers, but some do not. Therefore,
counsel must exercise caution in undertaking representation of
the losing party of a lawsuit. Remember, if the desired result is
not produced, you might be next. If the old trial lawyers' admoni-
tion to "check your own client's story first" is valid, it is doubly
so in these situations.
The first step in the lawyer's investigation of a potential legal
malpractice case is a meticulous interview of the client, which
should be prepared for in advance and documented with accurate
notes. The initial interview of any potential client is of course
crucial to the lawyer's determination of whether he has a case,
and each lawyer must develop his own techniques and style for
eliciting the information necessary for that decision. The follow-
ing observations are intended to serve as possible guidelines in
preparing for and conducting the initial interview in this area of
plaintiff's litigation.
The client should be instructed to bring to the first interview
any documentation that he has relating either to the underlying
matter or to the handling of his lawsuit by the potential defen-
dant. Scanning these papers at the beginning of the interview can
save substantial time because of the clarity they may lend to the
client's story. We should not forget that many clients are rela-
tively inarticulate and, of course, unschooled in the law. There-
fore, their explanations may create more mystery than enlighten-
ment.
Also, it is helpful if a brief version of the client's complaint
is available prior to the first appointment so that preliminary
legal research may be undertaken before the interview. A general
observation is that many disgruntled clients tend to have a monu-
mental appetite for minutia and a healthy disregard for the rele-
vant. Research serves as a guidepost for directing the client's
version of the facts in a relevant direction.
218 [Vol. 30
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The absolute necessity of a thorough initial interview cannot
be emphasized too strongly. If possible, it is good policy to allo-
cate at least two hours for it. Not only must the interview be
thorough, but it should also disclose any potential weakness in
the client's version of the facts. A thorough cross-examination is
necessary to ensure that the client is not merely feeding the attor-
ney information he believes the attorney wants to hear. Gener-
ally, a wise initial approach is to view everything the client says
with skepticism and, to the extent feasible, to investigate every
material detail of his story. At the outset it is helpful to find out
exactly what about the previous lawyer's conduct leads the client
to feel that he has been the victim of legal malpractice. In many
instances a nonmeritorious case will be disclosed at this point and
the otherwise lengthy interview may be terminated.
The client interview should include a detailed and exhaus-
tive inquiry into all the facts of the underlying legal matter about
which the client now complains. Obviously, unless the underlying
matter had merit, the legal malpractice suit is of dubious value.
Sufficient detail should be developed about the names of the
attorneys involved for the various parties and, if litigation is in-
volved, the court in which the matter was filed, and the dates and
times of filings, trial, discovery proceedings, and so forth as far
as the client is able to give this information.
After the initial interview, the second step will generally be
a review of the official files of the court, escrow, recorder's office,
or any public agency that may have had contact with the subject
matter of the client's claim. All relevant records should be copied
and made part of the permanent file. The contents of these re-
cords should be compared with the version tendered by the client
and, as with any stage of the investigation, if there is a discrep-
ancy between the client's version and matters disclosed from sub-
sequent investigation, the client should be brought back into the
office either to reconcile or explain the discrepancy.
Plaintiff's counsel should research the legal aspects of both
the underlying matter and the probable basis of the potential
defendant's liability. Needless to say, the research should be doc-
umented, at least in the form of handwritten 'notes, for future
reference. As noted earlier, some preliminary research is desirable
prior to the client's first appointment. But, relatively early legal
research is essential once employment seems likely so that further
investigation may be meaningful and directed towards reconcili-
ation of facts and law.
Many legal malpractice cases are referred to lawyers with a
1979]
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good background in general litigation. The potential malpractice,
however, may arise from a particular speciality of the law with
which the general trial practitioner has little or no familiarity. In
that case, consultation with an expert in the particular field of
law at the earliest opportunity is essential. In those states in
which an expert's consultation may be obtained and not disclosed
to the adversaries under the protection of the work product rule,
it is preferable to employ the expert initially as a consultant so
that his opinion need not be disclosed. An additional advantage
to this technique is that, particularly in a smaller locality, an
attorney may be willing to give a frank, but private, appraisal of
the nature of the malpractice and yet not wish to become involved
as a witness or have his identity disclosed because of a personal
relationship with the defendanit.
If the potential malpractice arises from trial, contacting the
adverse attorneys to get their version of the case may be advisa-
ble. 3 This serves a two-fold purpose. First, it is a good check on
the client's version, and, second, it provides a valuable insight
into the conduct of the potential defendant-attorney. This inva-
luable contact will also frequently provide insight into some of the
nuances of the litigation that might never be apparent from the
client interview, a naked review of the court file, or even the trial
transcript itself, and that might explain why the litigation was
lost. On the other hand, if the adverse attorney tells you the
potential plaintiff made an excellent impression at trial, this is
also a substantial factor in evaluating the case.
A substantial division of opinion exists on the question of
whether the potential defendant should be contacted prior to
filing suit." On the positive side, this contact has the advantage
of serving to confirm again the facts presented by the client-at
least to the degree that the defendant's integrity is greater than
his self-righteousness. Frequently, the defendant may well be
aware that his conduct amounted to malpractice and would pre-
fer to refer the matter to his carrier immediately and attempt to
bring about a settlement. Contacting the potential defendant
may also create a more favorable climate for the ultimate litiga-
13. Obviously, opposing counsel is under no compulsion to discuss the case, and
certainly no effort should be made to have him divulge matter that would invade the
attorney-client privilege. Similarly, care should be taken not to violate your own client's
confidences,
14. Whether the potential defendant is contacted at all depends on whether he is then
represented by counsel. If he is, it goes without saying that it would be a serious breach
of ethics to do so. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-104 (1976).
[Vol. 30
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tion since telephone notice of the intention to file suit is substan-
tially softer than the harsh service of unexpected suit papers. On
the other hand, the advance warning may conceivably do nothing
more thanevoke abuse.
The key to legal malpractice litigation (or to any litigation)
is careful and meticulous presuit investigation of the client's
cause: this cannot be overemphasized. Knowing what facts are
reasonably provable at the time of trial is essential, just to plead
the action properly. More importantly, however, as a matter of
professional courtesy, one owes to one's colleagues the duty of a
thorough investigation before subjecting them to a legal malprac-
tice action.
IV. EVALUATING THE ACTION: Is THERE LEGAL
MALPRACTICE LIAnrY?
Like other professional negligence actions the basic elements
of legal malpractice are: (1) a duty owed to the injured party
arising out of the contract for professional services, (2) a breach
of that duty by failure to exercise professional skill, and (3) dam-
age caused by the failure to exercise the requisite skill."5 Although
the elements of the cause of action are clear, courts have not
always clearly delineated the guidelines for proving each element.
Nonetheless, this section of the article presents an analysis of
whether legal malpractice liability will attach to a particular type
of lawyers' conduct within the familiar framework of those basic
elements.
A. Establishing the Duty of Care
If the plaintiff was the client of the defendant-attorney, the
duty of care clearly arises out of the contract for professional
services. Cases in which the duty is not so easily established are
those that are brought by a party other than the defendant-
attorney's immediate client. When will a third party have stand-
ing to sue the negligent attorney?
Formerly, most jurisdictions adhered to the rule that only the
client could be a party plaintiff because the action derived from
15. Although the concepts of cause in fact, proximate cause of injury, and provable
damages are separate theoretical concepts, in practice they blend together-especially in
legal malpractice cases. The injury will be an economic injury, and the case will turn on
whether the plaintiff suffered a loss, which in turn will hinge on whether that loss was
proximately caused by the defendant-attorney's negligence. For that reason, this aspect
of the plaintiff's case is discussed as one element.
19791
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a contractual relationship, and no one else was in privity.'5 The
more modern approach has been, however, that those parties
whom the attorney's services were intended to benefit have stand-
ing to sue. 7 For example, standing has been granted to beneficiar-
ies under a will," to the ward of a misappropriating guardian,"'
to the deceased client's administrator,"0 and to the client's credi-
tor when the attorney volunteered to file and protect the credi-
tor's security agreement arising from a loan to the client.2'
Although not yet a majority rule, the growing trend seems to
be to abolish the privity requirements in legal malpractice cases
as in other areas of the law.22 Generally, whether a third party has
standing to sue depends on a balancing of factors. In determining
whether privity should be required, the courts have pointed to
considerations such as the extent to which the transaction was
intended to benefit the third party, the foreseeability of harm, the
degree of certainty that the third party suffered injury, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the public policy
of preventing future harm. 2"
B. Establishing a Breach of the Duty of Care
An unfavorable result in itself is not legal malpractice. The
California Supreme Court expressed the general rule as follows:
The attorney is not liable for every mistake he may make in his
practice; he is not, in the absence of an express agreement, an
insurer of the soundness of his opinions or of the validity of an
instrument that he is engaged to draft; and he is not liable for
16. See, e.g., Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895), overruled in part,
Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). See also Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1181
(1972).
17. E.g., Fickett v. Superior Court, Pima Co., 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976);
McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
18, Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958); McAbee v. Edwards, 340
So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
19. Fickett v. Superior Court, Pima Co., 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976).
20. Jones v. Siesennop, 55 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 371 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
21. Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582
(Sup. Ct. 1977).
22. Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1181, 1185 (1972). This trend has not been adopted in every
modem decision. E.g., Metzker v. Slocum, 272 Or. 313, 537 P.2d 74 (1975). After holding
that under state law privity of contract was required, the court did go on to state, however,
that even if privity were not required the foreseeability of harm and the causal connection
between the injury and the negligence were too tenuous to support liability.
23. See cases and annotations cited in notes 17-22.
[Vol. 30
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being in error as to a question of law on which reasonable doubt
may be entertained by well-informed lawyers.
24
Only when the unfavorable result is proximately caused by the
lawyer's substandard skill or care, fraud, or other malfeasance
may it be characterized as malpractice.2 Rather than explore the
theoretical underpinnings of what is the standard of care, an
examination of some typical situations that may or may not be
characterized as legal malpractice may be more useful at this
point. The following situations are frequently presented to the
legal malpractice specialist by disgruntled clients seeking eco-
nomic comfort from their former counsel.
1. Time Limitations. -It has been estimated that 45% of all
claims presented against attorneys concern missing time limita-
tions, often the statute of limitations. 21 It is difficult to envision
an excuse for missing a statute of limitations or other time limit.
Therein, of course, lies the trap for the uninitiated. At least in the
hands of competent counsel, the case that is never filed or that
is dismissed for failure to prosecute, is often not of the highest
quality. Thus, even though the action is barred by the lawyer's
failure to observe the statute, did any damage flow therefrom? A
thorough investigation of the merits of the underlying case is
imperative, for a mere professional mistake does not the prov-
erbial silk purse from a sow's ear make.
Many a trial is lost that could be characterized a winner. The
lawyer, assuming he exercised the requisite skill and care, is not
rendered liable per se for the foibles of the bench and jury. But
should the case present grounds for appeal or other posttrial re-
lief, counsel is most certainly liable to his client if he fails to
protect the rights to appeal by timely notice and other procedural
requirements. Again, liability flows only from the loss of what
would probably have been a more favorable result to the client,
in other words, from a reversal and a different result on retrial.,
2. Trial Error. -The second most prevalent source of disen-
chantment, at least in the author's experience, is the wide-
24. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825
(1961), cert denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
25. Id.; Dorf v. Relles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966); Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581,
328 P.2d 164 (1958).
26. Levit & Mallen, Legal Malpractice 4 (1974) (materials used in California CLE
program).
27. Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954); Pusey v. Reid, 258
A.2d 460 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969); C/M of Baton Rouge v. Wood, 341 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct.
of App. 1977); Cornelissen v. Ort., 132 Mich. 294, 93 N.W. 617 (1903).
19791
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ranging field of trial error. Although in England the barrister is
virtually immune from liability for any act or omission that oc-
curs at trial,2" this is not true in the United States. The general
rule is that the trial lawyer is liable for failure to possess the
requisite skill or to exercise standard care in the trial of his
client's cause. 9
This is not to say, however, that any shortcoming at trial
may be a basis for a viable cause of action. For instance, reasona-
ble lawyers and judges would certainly agree that a trial lawyer
totally ignorant of the hearsay rule falls short of the mark of
possessing the standard of learning and skill ordinarily possessed
by other lawyers in good standing in any community. Likewise,
reasonable lawyers and judges would also agree that the attorney
who, though technically correct, objects to every questionable
statement at trial, soon paints himself as an obfuscator in the
eyes of the jury and thereby jeopardizes his case. Obviously the
lawyer is not liable for judgment calls at trial merely because, in
retrospect, they may not have been the best choice.
Where then, between the extremes, does the line of demarca-
tion between culpable and nonculpable conduct lie? Merely to
state that the test is that set forth by the courts-the use of the
degree of judgment, care, skill, and diligence commonly possessed
by lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity-provides little concrete
guidance for the practitioner. The standard seems to point to a
fact situation, the impact of which must be determined by the
trier of fact. Appellate authority is of little help in precisely defin-
ing the line of demarcation.
A recent case, pointing up at least an extreme at which the
court was critical of an attorney's judgment call involves con-
victed mass-slayer Juan Corona. Although People v. Corona"0 was
an appeal from Corona's conviction for multiple murders, not a
malpractice case, the court directly addressed the issue of judg-
ment calls. Corona was accused of the murder of twenty-five itin-
28. Baikie v. Chandless, 3 Camp. 17; Rondel v. Worsley, [19671 3 All E.R. 993
(H.L.).
29. E.g., Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1961). Commen-
tators have urged that the English Rule be adopted for trial errors. E.g., Thomason, A
Plea for Absolute Immunity for Errors in Trial Judgment, 14 WILLAMTrE L. REv. 369
(1978). As of now, however, only one American jurisdiction has followed the English Rule.
See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 423 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); Stricklan v. Koella, 546
S.W.2d 810 (Tenn. App. 1976). These decisions are limited to situations dealing with the
trial lawyer's judgment on how he will present his case to the trier of facts.
30. 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978).
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erant farm workers, and the case received nationwide publicity.
Corona had a long and documented history of mental illness. The
evidence pointing to Corona as the killer was overwhelming. Cor-
ona's counsel had the reports of three psychiatrists, one of whom
gave defendant a clean bill of mental health, although none
tended to bring Corona within the purview of the M'Naghten
rule." All three psychiatrists, however, recommended further
psychiatric observation.
The trial judge implored counsel to submit defendant for
further examination to determine whether he was mentally capa-
ble of assisting counsel at trial. Counsel, an experienced trial
lawyer, insisted that defendant was competent and suggested
that he could exonerate his client on the facts. The cause pro-
ceeded. The defense not only failed to plead legal insanity as a
defense, but produced no evidence of mental illness that would
tend to show Corona suffered from "diminished capacity," a par-
tial defense under California law. The defense rested the case
solely upon cross-examination of the State's witnesses without
calling a single witness, including defendant. The jury convicted
Corona on twenty-five counts of first degree murder.
32
On appeal and a separate writ of habeas corpus, consoli-
dated, Corona contended that he was deprived of effective assis-
tance of counsel in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments of the United States Constitution. The appellate court
agreed, reversing and remanding for retrial on grounds that Cor-
ona lacked effective counsel for the following reasons:
(1) In spite of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and
the weak (if not nonexistant) defense, counsel failed to
raise the various defenses relating to defendant's mental
status. Defense counsel, at the evidentiary hearing, stated
31. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), set the standard test for insanity that
is followed in most jurisdictions in this country. Under that test the accused is not crimi-
nally responsible if he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, that he did not know the nature and quality of his act, or, if he did know, that he
did not know his act was wrong. For a general discussion of the history and application of
the M'Naghten rule, see W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CmruNAL LAW 274-86 (1972).
32. During a special evidentiary hearing before a referee appointed by the court of
appeal, it developed that Corona's counsel had, in lieu of a fee (Corona was impecunious)
received a grant of exclusive rights to Corona's life story and the story of the trial. Prior
to commencement of trial counsel had entered a contract with MacMillan Publishing
Company to publish the book. The Court held, with obvious justification, that an unrecon-
cilable conflict of interest existed since counsel's economic interests were served by a
protracted trial with lurid publicity while Corona's interests obviously were not. Id. at 712,
145 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
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that he deliberately did not raise the defenses because he
thought his client was innocent, that the prosecution had
at best a flimsy, circumstantial case, and, to raise the
defenses of insanity would provide the prosecution with a
motive.3 (In California the insanity issue is tried bifur-
cated, only after a finding of guilty in the case-in-chief.)
(2) Counsel erred tactically in making an opening
statement (the crux of which was not borne out by the
evidence) prior to conclusion of the prosecution's evi-
dence, when the defense was inherently weak.
3
(3) Counsel, by failure to move to sequester the jury,
did not ameliorate the disastrous effect of adverse media
publicity.35
(4) Counsel failed to prepare adequately for trial by
thorough pretrial investigation."
The court acknowledged that the matter of judgment in trial
tactics and strategy ought not be viewed with hindsight or
second-guessing, as long as counsel's determination had some
rational support founded on reasonable, sound, legal principles
and fully developed facts." In short, on matters of trial tactics,
the attorney's judgment must be tested against a standard of
reasonable lawyers. Between the extremes the test would, as in
all negligence actions, appear to be one of fact.
In Tennessee, however, the federal district court in Woodruff
v. Tomlin,3" granted a judgment n.o.v. for the attorney in a legal
malpractice case in which plaintiffs contended that they lost the
underlying personal injury action because of their attorney's in-
adequate investigation, preparation, trial, and appeal of the case.
The court reasoned that any jury verdict in the malpractice ac-
tion would necessarily be predicated upon speculation about
what the personal injury jury might have found, but for the al-
leged neglect of the attorney. The court further asserted that it
would be unwise to permit a jury to second-guess a lawyer's exer-
cise of professional judgment at trial.
39
33. Id. at 717, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
34. Id. at 725, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
35. Id. at 706, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
36. Id.
37. Id. As Judge Hufstedler noted in Pineda v. Craven, 424 F.2d 369, 372 (9th Cir.
1970), "There is nothing strategic or tactical about ignorance .
38. 423 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
39. Id. at 1288. As stated in note 24, supra, Tennessee seems to be following the
English Rule on immunity from trial error.
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Can the viewpoints of Woodruff and Corona toward
"judgment calls" be reconciled? Clearly the plaintiff in Woodruff,
a civil action, did not have the extraordinary protection of the
sixth and fourteenth amendments critical to Corona's rights in a
criminal case. Also, the Corona court was not addressing itself to
a malpractice case.40 Whereas, perhaps, neither counsel did an
optimal investigation and preparation, Corona's counsel's con-
duct was so outrageous that it constituted dereliction as a matter
of law.
From a pragmatic viewpoit, although "trial error," with the
remarkable attributes of 20/20 hindsight, may bring many poten-
tial clients to the door, it is more often than not a rather slender
reed to lean on. Absent outrageous circumstances, such as Corona
presents, it usually is not the foundation of a strong plaintiffs
case.
3. Competence.-A different situation presents itself when
the attorney trying the case was simply beyond his capabilities.
This is particularly so in the metropolitan areas where the bar has
to a large degree turned toward specialization. Some jurisdictions
have recognized lack of competence as a breach of professional
competence and grounds for disciplinary action. 1 The test, ap-
parently, is not whether more competent counsel was available,
but whether the lawyer simply did not have the particular skills
demanded by the litigation. In short, would general practitioners
or inexperienced counsel in good standing have ordinarily referred
the matter to a competent specialist? Again, the case law does not
aid us. As a practical matter, as good a guideline as any seems
to be that the client's rights be adequately served and not subor-
dinated to the lawyer's economic interest in his fee. The amount
at stake in the case should also be a factor, for it is unlikely that
40. It is an interesting fact that no cases have yet been located that have upheld a
legal malpractice claim based on negligent representation in a criminal trial. See generally
Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 731 (1973).
41. E.g., CAL. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 6-101. This rule, entitled "Failing to Act
Competently" states:
A member of the state Bar shall not wilfully or habitually:
(1) Perform legal services for a client or clients if he knows or reasonably
should know that he does not possess the learning and skill ordinarily
possessed by lawyers in good standing who perform, but do not specialize
in similar services practicing in the same or similar locality and under
similar circumstances unless he associates or, where appropriate, profes-
sionally consults another lawyer who he reasonably believes does possess
the requisite learning and skill.
See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONslirry, DR 6-101 (1976).
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the top flight personal injury lawyers are available for referral of
a $1500.00 whiplash.
Failure to know, or to learn through research, the law applic-
able to the client's problems is a frequent basis for legal malprac-
tice suits. In California, the "Smith v. Lewis Syndrome" has
become a veritable gold mine of litigation. The California Su-
preme Court decided Smith v. Lewis42 in 1975. Lewis, a lawyer,
failed to research the community property nature of his client's
husband's military retirement pension before advising her in a
divorce action. The status of military pensions as community or
separate property was anything but clear under California law at
the time. 3 The court held that Lewis' failure to research the
matter was malpractice, even though after thorough research his
professional judgment may reasonably have led to a contrary
opinion. One may well imagine that the court has awakened a
slumbering giant. Nonetheless, every Smith situation is not mal-
practice. If the attorney considered the problem in formulating
his advice to the client, even though, in retrospect, he erroneously
failed to prophesy accurately the court's decision, he did all that
could be demanded at the time."
The vice of Lewis' research was not in what he failed to
discover or anticipate, but in his total failure to consider or re-
search the point, as Lewis admitted at trial. The court merely
stated that the attorneys' duty encompassed a duty to "discover
those additional rules of law which, although not commonly
known, may readily be found by standard research techniques."45
Again we are given no judicial guidelines on what constitutes
"standard" research techniques." Is a cursory review of Corpus
Juris Secundum sufficient, or is the standard that for writing
exhaustive law review articles on a minute point of law? Again,
since we dwell upon such loose phrases as "standard" and
"reasonable," must not the answer lie in an examination of all the
42. 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
43. Some three years after Mrs. Smith's divorce, the courts resolved the question in
a manner that would have been favorable to Ms. Smith. In re Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592,
517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974).
44. See Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d at 358, 530 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Altough the court in Smith v. Lewis did not specify what research techniques
are standard, it did point out that the information Mr. Lewis needed was available from
"the major authoritative reference works which attorneys routinely consult for a brief and
reliable exposition of the law. . . . (See, e.g. . . . A.L.R.. . . Am. Jur. 2d. . . Cal. Jur.
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surrounding facts and circumstances? What may well suffice as
research for a small claims court appeal would certainly fall short
when Ms. Smith's interest in General Smith's rather substantial
military pension is in dispute. A comparison with medical mal-
practice law might be useful on this point. Reasonably, the physi-
cian could hardly be faulted for failure to subject the patient to
a $450.00 bone scan when the complaint is a hangnail, even
though by hindsight, only.through bone scan could an otherwise
hidden malignancy have been detected. Conversely, if a patient
presents himself with monumental right lower quadrant pain, the
failure to take his temperature and a standard blood count to
diagnose or rule out appendicitis is inexcusable. In the final anal-
ysis, are not the situations analogous? As with the use of diagnos-
tic aids, the duty to research should depend on the difficulty of
the legal question and the expense of the research when compared
to the client's stake in the outcome. That in turn must be fac-
tually determined on a case-by-case basis. Suffice it to say, the
failure to do any research on a novel point is fraught with danger
for the practitioner.
A corollary problem arises when, through inadequate re-
search, lack of basic knowledge, or oversight, the attorney advises
the client and fails to anticipate all the lurking liabilities facing
the client. This is a particular hazard to the attorney in the role
of advisor as contrasted to advocate. Tax law and securities law,
which, to the average practitioner, possess the same degree of
clarity and logic as the old English land law, are particular pit-
falls. Counseling a client on the glorious advantages of an acceler-
ated depreciation tax shelter, but omitting the woes of recapture
comes to mind as an example of the type of advice that may bring
the counselor to the brink of disaster.
Corporate counsel may incur malpractice liaiblity of monu-
mental proportions from erroneous advice and opinions.47 Partic-
ularly, they are vulnerable if opinions adversely affect those out-
side the corporate inner circle. While the dimensions of damages
to the individual purchaser may be modest, they are enormous
when applied to an entire class of purchasers of a large issue of
corporate securities. This exposure has become so frightening
that most commercial carriers exclude coverage for any legal work
involving securities unless the insured pays a substantial prem-
ium surcharge and accepts a substantial deductible clause. If the
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claimed malpractice touches upon the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the attorney may also find himself a defendant in an
action by the S.E.C. s
Failure to exercise standard care or possess requisite skill in
carrying out the client's desires, as, for instance, frustrating the
client-testator's intent by ignoring the Mortmain Act, is a singu-
larly insidious example of malpractice. 9 It is insidious, because
it may only strike forty years in the future when the client dies
and the lawyer has retired and let his malpractice insurance
lapse.50 Although, traditionally, the privity of the attorney-client
relationship was a necessary element to a cause of action in legal
malpractice, the general rule now seems to be that the beneficiar-
ies of a will are proper parties plaintiff without resort to any
fictional basis of privity.5'
4. Informing the Client.-Although the doctrine of in-
formed consent, which has been well known to the medical profes-
sion for years 2 has not had currency in legal malpractice, by
analogy it should apply equally to both professions. While no
cases have been found applying informed consent to the attorney-
client relationship, likewise none has been found denying applica-
bility. In general terms the physician must have the consent of
his patient for any procedure he intends to perform. Not only
must the patient consent, but the consent must be "informed";
that is, the patient must be advised of the common risks and
hazards of the procedure so that the decision to accept the proce-
dure or opt for an alternative is an intelligent one. If the physician
fails to so advise the patient and the risk occurs, the physician
may be held liable for damages flowing from that risk, even
though the actual cause is not the doctor's fault, and if a reasona-
ble patient, possessed of the knowledge would have refused the
48. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Univer-
sal Major Indus. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FaD. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,804
(2d Cir. Dec. 16, 1976).
49. The Mortmain Act, which literally means "dead hand," promotes the free aliena-
tion of property by putting limitations on transfers of land to perpetual organizations. For
a collection of cases dealing with legal malpractice in connection with estate, will, or
succession matters, see Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 977 (1974).
50. Increasingly insurance companies have been changing the form of their coverage
from an item coverage (such as a will drawn during the period of time in which his
insurance is actively in force).
51. E.g., Kronzer v. First Nat'l Bank, 305 Minn. 415, 235 N.W.2d 187 (1975). See also
cases cited note 18 supra; Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1181, 1195 (1972).
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procedure. By analogy, since the legal affairs of the client are his,
the risks should be his to evaluate. He should be apprised of
viable alternatives and of the relative risks of each. In short, he
should be given the final choice.
If the analogy is valid, then, as with the physician, only those
risks of substantial magnitude that would reasonably affect the
client's determination need be discussed. For instance, disclosure
of the risk of liability for substantial court costs in the event of a
defense verdict on a personal injury case of modest proportions
may clearly be appropriate while the conceivable risk that the
legislature may, years in the future, alter the law relating to pre-
termitted heirs may not be relevant to a seventy-year old child-
less woman about to write a will. The "reasonable patient" doc-
trine would seem to require disclosure of only those risks that are
acknowledged to exist and carry substantial probable detriment
when compared to the benefit sought.
Apropos to informed consent is the situation in which before
or during litigation an offer of settlement is tendered to counsel,
who fails to communicate the offer to his client and then suffers
a less favorable judgment. If the client would have accepted the
offer (and in hindsight, after an adverse judgment, who would
not) the lawyer may well be liable if the jury accepts that a
reasonable client, possessed with the same facts and offer, would
have opted for settlement.
For example, a plaintiff's attorney received a $250,000.00
settlement offer from the defense during the trial of a medical
malpractice action. The attorney decided to risk a better verdict
(and larger fee) and failed to convey the offer. The jury returned
a verdict for the doctor. In the legal malpractice action that fol-
lowed, the jury not only returned a verdict in excess of the offer
but also awarded $140,000 punitive damages. 3
Even if the settlement offer is communicated, does the attor-
ney have the obligation to advise the client of the risks of going
to verdict? If so, is his judgment subject to hindsight if it proves
erroneous? Although we find no specific authority on point, the
thoughts expressed generally on trial judgment and informed con-
sent seem appropriate. In other words, at all stages, is not the
client entitled to the benefit of reasonable professional judgment?
Note that we comment only on advice on whether to settle-not
on the guarantee of a verdict.
53. Aiken v. Vletas, No. SEC 17634 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., filed August, 1978).
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5. Abandonment.-Although the general rule, in civil ac-
tions at least, is that the attorney-client relation may be termi-
nated at will by either the attorney or client," the timing of an
attorney-originated termination may be of some moment. The
abandonment of the client's cause on the eve of the expiration of
the statute of limitations, immediately before trial, or at a time
when the action will be soon subject to dismissal for lack of prose-
cution, may well be beyond the realm of propriety. Abandonment
of the client under these circumstances risks leaving him to se-
cure substitute counsel and, thus, carries a high risk of malprac-
tice liability and probably disciplinary proceedings.55 Even if the
underlying action was not of the highest quality, the effect of the
lawyer's blatant abandonment will surely adversely affect, if not
inflame, the jury.
6. Conflicts of Interest. -The concept of conflict of interests
is known by every lawyer and understood by few. The rule that
one may not represent conflicting interests is simple, but the bar,
through ignorance, inattention, or greed, shows an appalling
ability to disregard it.
A recent trial in California serves as a particularly good ex-
ample of a conflict of interests situation.56 The underlying case
was a medical malpractice action brought by a patient against a
neurosurgeon and an orthopedic surgeon who had serially per-
formed two successive lumbar surgeries on plaintiff. Both sur-
geons were insured by the same insurance carrier. Plaintiff had a
strong liability case against the orthopedist and a weak case
against the neurosurgeon. The carrier retained the same defense
counsel to represent both defendants. Apparently, the theory was
that the use of a single counsel would avoid mutual recrimina-
tions and enhance the chances for a defense verdict for each de-
fendant. In keeping with the "game plan," the neurosurgeon was
dissuaded from giving an opinion that would have directly scut-
tled the orthopedist's defense, but, in all probability, would have
exonerated himself. The jury returned a verdict against both de-
fendants. The neurosurgeon then sued his attorney for malprac-
tice, claiming as damages, his loss of reputation and the increased
54. CAL. CIVIL PROC. CODE § 284 (West 1954); Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494
P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972). Most jurisdictions, however, require either client consent
or a court order to withdraw once suit is filed.
55. ABA CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONSBILIrY, DR 2-110 (1976).
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cost of insurance in the future.57
The suit was predicated upon the attorney's ignoring the
obvious conflict of interest. Apparently, the jury was more cogni-
zant of the conflict of interests rule than was the erstwhile defense
lawyer; they awarded the neurosurgeon-plaintiff damages of
$130,000.00. 58
7. Proof of the Standard of Care. -These examples, though
not exhaustive, illustrate situations that might point to lawyer
malpractice. The degree of skill that should be exercised in each
situation must still be proved at trial. The standard of care re-
quired of attorneys is proved much the same as it is in any tort
case. Since lay jurors will not be as aware of the niceties of law
practice as they are of the traffic code, it is wise to spend a little
time enlightening them. Although the rule varies in different ju-
risdictions, the burden of proving the standard may be met by
one of three means: as a matter of law, as a matter of expert
testimony, or as a matter of violation of statute, rule of profes-
sional conduct, or canon of ethics.
Traditionally, it was thought that the trial judge, himself a
lawyer, should set the standard of care as a matter of law, leaving
only the question of adherence to the standard as a matter of fact
for the jury. This rule apparently developed during the era before
specialization became widespread. As society and law become
more complex and legal specialization grows, it becomes rather
naive to expect even the most learned jurist to understand the
nuances and subtleties of specialized practice. Therefore, the
standard must more and more be subject to proof by expert testi-
mony, just as one proves the standard in medical malpractice.',
As the rules of practice and professional conduct become
increasingly codified, there seems no logical reason why proof of
violation of the rules ought not be negligence per se, as in any
other action sounding in negligence."
57. Id.
58. This case is an example of the attorney's owing allegience to conflicting interests
other than his own. For a conflict arising between the attorney's personal interests and
those of his client, see, e.g., Public Taxi Service, Inc. v. Barrett, 44 Ill. App. 3d 452, 357
N.E.2d 1232 (1976). See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969).
59. See generally, Comment, The Use of Expert Testimony inActions Against Litiga-
tion Attorneys, 14 WILUMEM L.J. 425 (1978); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1442 (1968).
60. See Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney
Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. Rav. 281 (1979).
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C. Proximate Cause and Damages-A Major
Stumbling Block
Of course, "negligence in the air" is legally inadequate to
perfect a cause of action. Plaintiff must plead and prove damages
proximately caused by the negligence. In many cases of relatively
clear-cut negligence, particularly those in which a statute of limi-
tations has run, the defense will admit negligence, but deny that
the neglect proximately caused any damages. Essentially, the
defense's posture is, "we let the statute of limitations run, but the
plaintiff could not have prevailed anyway." The general defense
attitude is that if plaintiff claims injury, let him try and win his
case against the original defendant. If he fails to convince the jury
that his underlying action would have been decided in his favor,
he should not recover. This is sometimes referred to as the "case
within a case" doctrine.
Obviously, the defendant desires the tactical advantage of
forcing the plaintiff to try the "case within a case" so that any
defensive matter in the underlying suit is available in the mal-
practice action. The legal authority is less than clear, however,
that strict application of the doctrine is warranted." Unquestion-
ably, no matter how gross the attorney's neglect, the client suffers
no damage if the underlying matter was totally devoid of merit.
For instance, if the underlying matter were one that would have
terminated as a matter of law by way of nonsuit, summary judg-
ment, directed verdict, or judgment n.o.v., then obviously the
errant defendant-lawyer should prevail. In such a case, the strict
application of the "case within a case" concept is logical. Paren-
thetically, one questions why any attorney would bring the mal-
practice case in the first place.
The vast majority of cases litigated, however, are neither
totally devoid of merit nor totally meritorious.' This is particu-
larly true in tort litigation. Recent studies have shown, for in-
stance, that 92.9% of personal injury suits filed are settled with-
out trial.2 Presumably many, if not most, of those cases were
settled by compromise on the issue of liability. Since proof in
civil actions is predicated upon probability and not certainty,
logic dictates that it should be sufficient for plaintiff to show the
probability of favorable settlement rather than having to win
61. See Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970); Gay & Taylor
v. American Cas. Co., 53 Tenn. App. 120, 381 S.W.2d 304 (1964). See generally, R. MAL-
LEN & V. Lavrr, LEoAL MALPRACTICE §§ 420-26 (1977).
62. Drayton, No-Fault, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone (1978) (Pamphlet published
by the California Trial Lawyers Association).
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the "case within a case" to prevail. A rule to the contrary seems
devoid of logic and smacks of reconstruction of the citadel of
privilege.
Plaintiff's counsel should resist strict application of the "case
within a case" rule, although many trial judges will treat the
doctrine as though carved in marble. A comprehensive trial brief
stating the cogent reasons for not applying the rule should be
prepared in advance of trial, in anticipation that the defense will
be raised. The brief should review the local authorities on "case
within a case," much in line with the thoughts herein. If the
defense predicates its position on the case authority that
"plaintiff must prove that but for defendants' negligence, he
would have achieved a more favorable result," plaintiff should
demonstrate that this language does not compel trying the under-
lying case to verdict for the plaintiff. He must convince the court
that, verdict aside, defendant's negligence precluded a favorable
disposition by way of settlement. These thoughts may be helpful
in drafting such a trial memorandum.
In those cases in which the defendant's inactivity, inepti-
tude, or ignorance has precluded the client, because of lapse of
time, loss of physical evidence, or whatever, from proving the
underlying case, the "case within a case" rule ought never to
apply. The rule that one whose wrongful conduct renders the
ascertainment of damages difficult cannot complain that the trier
of fact must merely estimate the damages, should control.13 In
other words, why should the attorney who renders proof of the
client's underlying case impossible by failure to preserve evidence
or locate witnesses, be permitted to use his own negligence as a
shield against the innocent client?64 The law is clear that one
ought not profit by his own wrong.
The plaintiff, however, must prove sufficient facts to make
his plea for "reasonable settlement value" persuasive. In other
words, to overcome strict application the plaintiff must indeed
try the "case within a case" to a rather significant extent. Thus
when the rule is not strictly applied, counsel should consider the
use of experts, such as prominent plaintiff and defense counsel
and insurance claims personnel, to establish probable settlement
63. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975); Bernard
v. Walkup, 272 Cal. App. 2d 595, 77 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1969). See also Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d
62, 65 (1956).
64. See, e.g., Guiffra v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 293 So. 2d 518 (La. App.
1974); Collier v. Pulliam, 81 Tenn. 114 (1884).
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value. The usual defense objection is that such testimony is spec-
ulative or conjectural. The answer to that objection is that ex-
perts make these professional evaluations daily and settle cases
for hard cash based upon those evaluations. Bearing in mind that
a very high percentage of tort lawsuits settle short of trial, the
testimony is not speculative, but solidly based upon probability.
The authority is divided, however, on whether expert testi-
mony is admissable to prove either the probable outcome or rea-
sonable settlement value of the underlying case. Those cases
holding that such expert testimony is inadmissible have reasoned
that it would invade the province of the jury" or consume too
much time.6 Some have refused admission because there had
been no evidence that the case would have been settled. 7 It would
seem that the latter objection, at least, could be easily cured by
testimony on the prevalence of settlement. Other cases have ad-
mitted expert testimony on the reasoning that it is an aid to the
trier of fact not elsewhere available.
68
The plaintiffs burden is to show that not only would he have
achieved a more favorable outcome but for the defendant-
attorney's neglect, but also that any judgment would have been
collectible either through insurance or the prior defendant's per-
sonal assets.69 When the defendant is insolvent, has no assets not
exempt from levy sufficient to satisfy judgment, nor has any in-
surance, the plaintiff will be denied recovery. By the same token
if the defendant were underinsured, plaintiff would seem limited
in his recovery to the amount of the policy (and any other assets
subject to execution). We find no cases commenting on whether
plaintiff would be permitted to bring in facts that would set up
the theory of excess liability of the defendant's carrier for failure
to settle in good faith within their policy limits. Needless to say,
plaintiffs counsel should ascertain that a meritorious and collec-
tible underlying case exists before plunging onto the primrose
path of legal malpractice litigation.
65. Shouse v. Consolidated Flour Mills Co., 132 Kan. 108, 294 P. 657 (1931).
66. E.g., Fuschetti v. Berman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 319 A.2d 781 (1974).
67. Id.
68. Duncan v. Lord, 409 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Warwick v. Dotter, 190 So.
2d 596 (Fla. App. 1966); Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or. 71, 559 P.2d 1275 (1977).
69. Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960); Priest v. Dod-
sworth, 235 Ill. 613, 85 N.E. 940 (1908); Eccles v. Stephenson, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 517 (1814);
Vooth v. McEachen, 181 N.Y. 28, 73 N.E. 488 (1905); Hammons v. Schrunk, 409 Or. 127,
305 P.2d 405 (1956).
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V. A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF PROCEDURAL ASPECTS-
PLEADING, DISCOVERY, MOTIONS, AND TRIAL
Legal malpractice is regarded as a matter arising out of a
contractual relationship, that of attorney and client. The actual
conduct causing the malpractice, however, is generally charac-
terized as tortious. 0 The complaint, then, should set forth the
underlying attorney-client relationship, the defendant-attorney's
failure to possess the requisite level of learning, skill, and knowl-
edge ordinarily possessed by other attorneys in good standing,
and his negligent failure to apply this skill, knowledge, and learn-
ing to his client's affairs. Although negligence is the gravamen of
most legal malpractice suits, one must not forget that if the attor-
ney has guaranteed a result he may, indeed, have liability arising
from warranty or a frank breach of contract. In the event that
there is fraud or misrepresentation, of course, these are likewise
additional bases for the action against the attorney. If the latter
exists, punitive damages should be considered.
The injured client is always a proper plaintiff. But, as noted
earlier, the trend is to allow third party nonclients to bring suit
in a growing number of situations.7' If the plaintiff is not the
attorney's client, facts necessary to show the plaintiff's status as
a proper party plaintiff should be pleaded.
The parties defendant, other than the attorney guilty of the
malfeasance, are essentially the same parties that would be the
defendants in any tort action. If the defendant is a member of an
incorporated law firm or partnership, the corporation or partner-
ship and each individual partner should be named as parties
defendant. The reason for this, obiously, is to broaden the base
of liability and potential insurance coverage and ability to re-
spond in damages. If the matter was one that was referred to the
principal defendant by another attorney and the other attorney
shared in the fees generated or had a right to share in fees, if
generated, it appears that on a joint venture theory, such an
attorney is likewise a proper defendant.
2
The statute of limitations applicable in actions for legal mal-
practice varies among jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions have a
70. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421,
98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
71. See cases cited and discussed notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
72. Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960); Senneff v. Healy,
155 Iowa 82, 135 N.W. 27 (1912); Hill v. Curtis, 154 A.D. 662, 139 N.Y.S. 428 (1913).
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statute specifically naming legal malpractice 3 and some have
professional malpractice statutes.74 Other courts use statutes
written for tort, contract, or fraud cases.75 If the statutory or
common-law statute of limitations has expired local authorities
must then be checked to ascertain whether the doctrine of post-
poned accrual applies. This appears to be more or less the general
rule in the United States. 8 Essentially, since the attorney-client
relationship is one of the highest fiduciary order, it is held that
even though the attorney's malpractice may have been commit-
ted sufficiently far in the past for the statute of limitations to run,.
the accrual of the cause of action does not take place for the
purpose of the statute's running until the client knows or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the malprac-
tice. In cases in which the attorney's efforts contemplate some
future event, as for instance, in the preparation of a will, the
statute of limitations generally does not commence running until
the death of the testator. If the plaintiff relies on postponed ac-
crual to overcome the effect of the statute of limitations, this
should be pleaded with specificity in the complaint.
The pleading of a legal malpractice action is not substan-
tially different from the pleading of any other tort. action and
local practice should be the guideline. The above suggestions
merely point out some special instances that the practitioner may
wish to consider in a legal malpractice action.
Discovery practices vary considerably from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and it is not within the scope of this article to probe
into those differences; nor is it the intent to exhaust the subject
of pretrial discovery and motions. Those discovery techniques
available in any litigation are available in legal malpractice and,
to the extent warranted, should be utilized. As early as is permis-
sible after filing suit, a motion should be made to produce, in-
spect, and copy the defendant-attorney's file. Not only should the
motion encompass the file, but it should also encompass all other
73. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 2-34 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1977).
74, E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (West Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 5-229 (Supp.
1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-19-1 (Bums 1973); NzB. REv. STAT. § 25-208 (1975); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (1974).
75. California, by statutory construction, uses CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 339(1) (West
1954) providing a two-year limitation on contracts and obligations not in writing. For a
general summary and discussion of the applicability of various statutes of limitations, see
R. MALLFN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 192-198 (1977).
76. Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969). See also
cases discussed in R. MALLN & V. LEviT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 204 (1977).
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documents in the attorney's office relating to the plaintiff's mat-
ter such as time records, telephone messages, accountings, and
any other document touching on the case.
The need to use interrogatories and depositions to discover
further evidence is self-evident. The order in which depositions
and interrogatories are used is a matter that essentially must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Generally, however, before
other interrogatories are posed or depositions are scheduled a
thorough review of all documentary matter should be undertaken.
This is particularly true for the plaintiff's deposition. Whereas
the defendant-attorney will always have his file in possession to
refresh his memory, most clients seem to be poverty stricken
when it comes to documentation. Therefore, to prepare the plain-
tiff properly for his deposition, he should have available all corre-
spondence to and from the attorney and any other documentation
that would refresh his recollection.
The defendant's deposition in a legal malpractice action is
of considerable importance. It provides plaintiff's counsel with an
excellent opportunity to evaluate the defendant's credibility as a
witness. It is particularly important to note his reaction to embar-
rassing questions and his general attitude toward giving testi-
mony. The deposition should be as thorough as possible and
should cover, with great detail, his education, training, qualifica-
tions, his membership in organizations, the legal publications he
regularly reads, and the details of the nature of his practice. His
entire handling of the plaintiff's legal affairs should be carefully
explored. If any of the documents in his file are ambiguous he
should be called upon to explain that ambiguity.
Since the subjective quality of the attorney's advice may well
be an issue, his thought processes in arriving at his opinions and
judgments that he made during the handling of the client's affairs
should be thoroughly dissected. He should, likewise, be asked to
explain what, in his opinion, the precise standard of care under
the circumstances of the client's case would have been. Ob-
viously, if the standard of care that is opined by the defendant is
greater than his own conduct, the plaintiff's case takes on rather
heroic proportions. If, on the other hand, he establishes a stan-
dard of care that is demonstrably inadequate, he can be im-
peached by other experts in the field.
Whether counsel should depose adverse counsel in the under-
lying litigation is a matter of choice. The author's personal choice
has been not to depose these attorneys unless they show a bias
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and favor the defendant or refuse to discuss the case at all. If the
opposing counsel is well known to plaintiff's counsel and willing
to cooperate without the necessity of a deposition, it seems prefer-
able not to depose him.
In those jurisdictions where it is possible to obtain a protec-
tive order compelling both parties to disclose their expert wit-
nesses prior to trial, that order should be obtained and experts for
both sides should be deposed. In the first place, it is good to know
the defendent's theory of the case and, second, it is essential that
one's own experts be apprised of those opinions so that a proper
rebuttal may be prepared.
Presumably because lawyers tend to get rough treatment
from lay juries, it can be anticipated that every possible pretrial
and trial motion that could take the matter away from a jury will
be made by the defense. It is thus necessary that the plaintiff's
counsel have his file documented and fortified to withstand the
onslaught of demurrers, motions to strike, motions for summary
judgment, motions for judgment on the pleadings, motions for
nonsuit, motions for directed verdict, and motions for judgment
non obstante verdicto. On the other hand, if the neglect of the
defendant-attorney appears to be established as a matter of law,
plaintiff's counsel should utilize these motions to eliminate those
issues from the case.
Again, it must be obvious that the proper and diligent use
of discovery is as essential, if not more so, in legal malpractice
litigation as it is in any litigation, if one hopes to be successful.
From the plaintiff's viewpoint, there would seem to be no real
question but that a jury trial is preferable to a trial to the court.
The obvious risk of favoritism by a local judge cannot be ignored,
although most judges will disqualify themselves if they know the
defendant. Judges and lawyers are colleagues, however, and even
at the subconscious level, the mere risk of bias against the plain-
tiff is unacceptable. On the other hand, the tendency of a lay jury
to identify with the lay plaintiff is an advantage that must be
preserved. It must likewise not be ignored that, albeit unjust in
most instances, lawyers are generally not trusted. Thus, it is es-
sential that plaintiff's counsel meticulously preserve his client's
right to trial by jury, for, if waived, you may be assured that the
defense will not reinstate the jury.
VI. CONCLUSION
Every lawsuit is unique and has its own personality. The art
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of advocacy is not equated to computer science. Success in legal
malpractice litigation, like all litigation hinges upon meticulous
preparation and forensic skill. It is no more clothed in mystique
than a rear end collision on the freeway-but it does demand
more preparation.
In these brief pages, an attempt has been made to put the
panorama of legal malpractice in the perspective of the plaintiffs
lawyer. The task, properly done, would require a volume or two.
If one key point should be selected to impress upon the practi-
tioner, it is this: select your cases with the degree of care that you
would have a colleague select a case if you were the potential
defendant. If you do, you need apologize to no one for suing an-
other lawyer.
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